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Abstract
This paper explores the history of ELIZA, a computer programme approximating a Rogerian therapist, developed by Jospeh 
Weizenbaum at MIT in the 1970s, as an early AI experiment. ELIZA’s reception provoked Weizenbaum to re-appraise the 
relationship between ‘computer power and human reason’ and to attack the ‘powerful delusional thinking’ about computers 
and their intelligence that he understood to be widespread in the general public and also amongst experts. The root issue 
for Weizenbaum was whether human thought could be ‘entirely computable’ (reducible to logical formalism). This also 
provoked him to re-consider the nature of machine intelligence and to question the instantiation of its logics in the social 
world, which would come to operate, he said, as a ‘slow acting poison’. Exploring Weizenbaum’s 20th Century apostasy, in 
the light of ELIZA, illustrates ways in which contemporary anxieties and debates over machine smartness connect to earlier 
formations. In particular, this article argues that it is in its designation as a computational therapist that ELIZA is most sig-
nificant today. ELIZA points towards a form of human–machine relationship now pervasive, a precursor of the ‘machinic 
therapeutic’ condition we find ourselves in, and thus speaks very directly to questions concerning modulation, autonomy, 
and the new behaviorism that are currently arising.
Keywords Automation anxiety · AI · Expertise · Digital · Computational history · Media · Weizenbaum
1 Introduction
This joining of an illicit metaphor to an ill-thought out 
idea then breeds, and is perceived to legitimate, such 
perverse propositions as that, for example, a computer 
can be programmed to become an effective psycho-
therapist’ (Weizenbaum, 1976: 206).
As artificial and human intelligences become more tightly 
enmeshed, long-standing questions around the application 
of machine logics to human affairs arise with new urgency. 
Recently, an accelerating trend towards the modulation 
of human behavior through computational techniques has 
gained attention. Explicitly behaviorist nudge-based (Sun-
stein and Thaler, 2008) social (media) programmes launched 
by governments ‘for our own good’—and by corporations 
for theirs—instantiate a therapeutic relationship between 
computer and human, designed to change human behavior 
rather than assist in informing autonomous human decision-
making or reasoning (Danaher 2017; Yeung 2012; Freed-
man 2012). Computational modulation, moreover, is also an 
element in a broader cultural formation; one in which the 
therapeutic injunction—to change the self—increasingly 
operates as a pervasive logic. Deploying the computational 
within various techniques to ‘address’ human issues is part 
of how we live now; assisted by machines.
The therapeutic also has purchase as a way of conceptual-
izing evolving human–computer relationships, particularly 
those concerned with intelligence and its allocation; it con-
stitutes the interface layer in a new intelligence economy. 
Today developments in AI, bringing new intelligences to 
contribute to this economy, produce unease in many quar-
ters. Anxieties coalesce around the over-taking of human 
intelligence by machines, on the one hand (see e.g. Bill 
Gates, Bill Joy, and Stephen Hawking’s widely publicized 
pronouncements), and the use of such machines to cement 
existing forms of human domination and increase un-
freedom for dominated groups on the other (see e.g. Dean, 
2005). That the prospects for this ‘anxious relationship’ 
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(Bassett 2017) may be configured in therapeutic terms is 
already established. Howells and Moore rightly identify the 
therapeutic as a key node of the philosopher Bernard Stie-
gler’s pharmacological inquiry into technics and the human 
(Stiegler 2013; Howells and Moore 2013). Stiegler, explor-
ing pharmacology and technology, particularly in What 
Makes Life Worth Living (2013), argues that computational 
technology is toxic, but may also be curative (we might say 
both iatrogenic and potentially remedial), within the cultures 
it co-constitutes, and co-evolves. Drawing on Winnicott’s 
object-relations psychoanalysis, Stiegler views computa-
tional technology as a transitional object, something simul-
taneously ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, through which a mode of 
engagement with the world may be negotiated.
Others before Stiegler, notably those developing anthro-
pologically informed studies of technology and everyday 
life in the late 1990s, also drew inspiration from Winnicott, 
designating various ‘old’ media technologies ‘transitional 
objects’ (see e.g. Silverstone’s 1993 work on television1). 
However it is a tale involving the therapeutic and the spe-
cifically computational that is of interest here, and that is 
brought to bear on current developments.
There are two protagonists in this tale, which begins in 
the mid 1960s. The first is ELIZA, a ‘chatterbot approximat-
ing a Rogerian therapist’ (Wardrip-Fruin 2009). Part of a 
machine-learning and natural language processing experi-
ment, ELIZA was designed to carry out conversations in 
English with human users, and was, it was avowed, only 
a created as a therapist for reasons of research ‘conveni-
ence’. Once described as ‘the most widely quoted computer 
program in history’ (Turkle 1984: 39), ELIZA was a ‘phe-
nomenon’2 from the start, gaining something approaching 
celebrity status in various interested circles. The second 
protagonist is Joseph Weizenbaum, an MIT computer sci-
entist who came to disavow his artificial progeny. Weizen-
baum believed that the reception awarded to ELIZA was 
unwarranted and misplaced. Notably, the proposition that ‘a 
computer can be programmed to become an effective psy-
chotherapist’ was ‘perverse’ (Weizenbaum, 1976: 206). The 
ELIZA events, for him, provided evidence that a mode of 
‘powerful delusional thinking’ about computers and their 
intelligence was circulating in the general public and in the 
relevant expert communities of computer science/AI and 
psychology.
ELIZA provoked Weizenbaum to re-assess Artificial 
Intelligence and its potential impacts. Remaining an advo-
cate of computer science, and of computer autonomy in spe-
cific spheres, he became a lifelong critic of untrammeled 
computational expansion.3 In ‘Computer Power and Human 
Reason’ (1976), the work for which he became best known, 
he called for limits on the expansion of computational log-
ics and systems into human affairs. In particular, he argued 
that the desires of the AI community to create intelligent 
artificial life, and to establish a more fully cybernetic soci-
ety, were impossible to fully realize, and undesirable in any 
case. Coming from a scholar4 inside one of computer sci-
ence’s most eminent ‘temples of learning’ this was apostasy. 
It made for an attack that was distinctively different from 
the works of critical theorists of technology (Arendt, Ellul, 
or Mumford for instance), as its author noted; Weizenbaum 
does not build an abstract critique of technocratic ration-
ality, but works through, and deals with, ramifications for 
the social world of developments and debates in computer 
science, centrally those around simulation and intelligence.
In this article, I explore ELIZA, the ELIZA events, and 
Weizenbaum’s response to them in broadly media archae-
ological terms. The intention is to let the earlier moment 
act differently, and thus to re-frame current debates around 
therapeutic modulation, thereby re-contextualizing the thera-
peutic in new economies of engagement between various 
human and non-human controlling ‘intelligences’. What is 
offered here is thus a history of the present.
Sources include Weizenbaum’s own writings (CPHR, 
ACM papers), and the documentary Plug and Pray, in 
which Weizenbaum’s contemplation on his own mortal-
ity is set against the simulated, and possibly immortal, 
forms of ‘life’ arising in the Bits and Atoms lab at MIT.5 
Also relevant are later assessments—notably Sherry Tur-
kle’s discussion of ELIZA and its users in the Second Self, 
which was published in the context of the early Web boom 
1 Lines of inquiry in new media studies continue to develop (see e.g. 
Mowlabocus, 2016).
2  ELIZA took its name from the heroine of Shaw’s Pygmalion—
the intention being that it might learn from its interactions (Weizen-
baum, January, 1966). The ‘phenomenon’ was a character, in Dickin’s 
Nicolas Nickelby, notable for her much-lauded and recorded infant 
achievements.
3 Weizenbaum parallels his own career history with that of Polyani. 
The latter was a chemist whose engagement with discussions about 
the mechanical conception of man began as a single intervention—an 
argument with Bukharin—but became a lifelong concern (Weizen-
baum, 1976).
4 SLIP (Symmetric LIst Processor) is a list-processing computer pro-
gramming language developed by Weizenbaum in the 1960s. It was 
first implemented as an extension to the Fortran programming lan-
guage, and later embedded into MAD and ALGOL. ELIZA was writ-
ten in SLIP (Weizenbaum, 1966).
5 This documentary on Weizenbaum brings into relation contempo-
rary developments in AI and robotics and Weizenbaum’s own cogi-
tations on Eliza and AI in general. It is wound around two trajecto-
ries; the robotic doppelganger of the scientist Ishiguro at the Bits and 
Atoms lab of MIT, who is slowly coming to a form of life, and the 
death—the human end—of Weizenbaum himself. Issues thus arise 
about how much liveliness there might be to go around.
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(Turkle, 2005). Alongside these textual resources, there is 
what may be gleaned through a medium analytic route. This 
demands attention to be paid to the program, and to ELIZA’s 
original instantiation on a distributed mainframe system in 
which exchanges between computer and human user were 
printed and delivered with what Weizenbaum defined as an 
‘acceptable latency’ (Weizenbaum, 1966). The components 
of ELIZA, and the conditions of its early instantiation, are 
documented and inform this account. The program may also 
be explored by re-running it on new platforms, and though 
emulation has clear limits (‘acceptable latency’ changes 
with time for instance), it has enabled direct interrogation 
of ELIZA. This is sometimes an oddly compelling enter-
prise: ‘Come, come’ I am admonished, as I write this article, 
‘elucidate your thoughts’…6
Two kinds of source material, elements broadly textual 
and discursive on the one hand, and material on the other, 
thus inform this article, and also reproduce a tension that 
was always there; Weizenbaum’s sense was that a false 
ELIZA narrative had been built up which was at odds with 
the reality of ELIZA—understood to inhere solely in the 
function of/functioning of the program. Taking seriously the 
proposition that ELIZA was more than that, would, he said, 
be ‘monstrous’ or even ‘monstrously wrong’.
Producing detailed accounts of ELIZA’s workings, he 
sought to exchange narrative glamour for programming 
grammar and thus to realign expectations with reality, argu-
ing that:
‘…once a particular program is unmasked, once its 
inner workings are explained in language sufficiently 
plain to induce understanding, its magic crumbles 
away; it stands revealed as a mere collection of pro-
cedures, each quite comprehensible.’ (Weizenbaum, 
ACM).
ELIZA was not magic, could not administer therapy, and 
it could certainly only simulate a therapeutic relationship. 
What looked like magic—or ‘life’, or ‘intelligent conversa-
tion’—was only a collection of procedures, and this was how 
its significance should be understood. (Weizenbaum 1966). 
So Weizenbaum argued. Contra Weizenbaum (although this 
is in many ways also a sympathetic reading of his position), 
in this article it is argued that the ascription ‘therapist’, and 
the discourse it produced, proximately (in operation), and 
in public (the circulation of ELIZA stories), mattered, and 
indeed both were an intrinsic part of ELIZA’s constitution.
Moreover, I argue that it is as a computational thera-
pist that ELIZA is significant today. Contemporary anxi-
eties about machine smartness and new forms of artificial 
intelligence revive the salience of earlier forms of compu-
tational anxiety. ELIZA is an early iteration of a form of 
human–machine relationship now pervasive, a precursor 
of what I term the ‘machinic therapeutic’ condition we find 
ourselves in, and thus speaks very directly to questions con-
cerning modulation, autonomy, and the new behaviorism 
that are currently arising.
Exploring this, in what follows ELIZA and Weizenbaum’s 
response to ELIZA are first set in the context of then cur-
rent debates within psychology which set advocates of ‘self-
actualization’ against behaviorism with its stress on making 
the human ‘an object to himself’ (Skinner/Rogers: Dialogue, 
1976). I then return to the present to argue that it is relation 
to the therapeutic, and in relation to the question of the form 
of the ‘cure’ that we desire, that the ELIZA events revive in 
salience for us today. Developments in artificial intelligence 
which enable the further ‘automation of expertise’ (Bassett 
et al. 2013; Bassett 2013), and the expansion of the ‘dron-
ing’ of experience’ (Andrejevic, 2015), are, after all, both 
forms of the ‘making object’ of human subjects. The rise of 
computationally driven behaviorist politics, and marketing 
designed to directly modulate human activities, are only the 
most obvious manifestations of this more fundamental, if 
still putative, re-formation.
2  What ELIZA did
ELIZA consisted of a language analyzer and a script or set 
of rules ‘… like those that might be given to an actor… to 
improvise around a certain theme’. The resulting bot was 
designed to undertake real interactions with human interloc-
utors based on ‘simulation’ or ‘impersonation’ (Weizenbaum 
1976: 3). The ELIZA that became synonymous with the 
name was, strictly speaking, ELIZA running  DOCTOR(4), 
a script setting rules for organizing interactions between a 
Rogerian analyst and an analysand. Rogerian therapy was 
thought apt because it draws on extensive forms of mirror-
ing of the patient by the therapist, producing an unusually 
constrained form of dialogue which is open at one end but 
closed at the other (Weizenbaum, 1972). This is suitable 
for natural language-processing experiments because it 
produces a clear context and demands a limited repertoire 
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of responses which may be ordered in reasonably flexible 
strings or lists (Turkle, 1984, Weizenbaum, 1976, 1972). In 
this scenario, if the machine must do the work of simulation, 
the patient does most of the cognitive work of interpretation. 
The hope was that ELIZA’s responses, often tendentious or 
eccentric, might nonetheless seem appropriate in this rather 
forgiving context.
The NLP ambitions for ELIZA were avowedly modest, 
but even assessed within these parameters the program had 
many limitations. It was (and is) easy to ‘trick’, it can be 
made to loop recursively, and is quickly ‘persuaded’ to come 
out with nonsensical answers. Claims that ELIZA demon-
strated a ‘general solution to the problem of computer under-
standing of natural language’ (Schank, cited in Weizenbaum 
1976: 202), and that it ushered in radically new kinds of 
smartness in machines, were justifiably claimed by its crea-
tor to be egregious. Weizenbaum commented that ELIZA 
had been ‘shockingly misunderstood’ as a technical advance, 
and was subject to ‘enormously exaggerated attributions’ 
(1976: 7). It was not only part of, but also contributed to, a 
worldview in which the power of artificial intelligences was 
habitually amplified and the dominance of machine logics 
lauded. Later, he defined three areas of particular concern.
First, the public ‘success’ of ELIZA contributed to expan-
sion of the influence of the ‘artificial intelligentsia’ with its 
‘bombastically exhibited’ hubris (1976: 221). At the core of 
this ‘hubris’—and at the heart of the AI project—was the 
goal of the full simulation of human intelligence or equiva-
lent machine intelligence. Weizenbaum thought that taking 
this as a realistic goal was a fantasy, but a dangerous fantasy. 
He was concerned about the ascension of the worldview it 
promoted—one in which man is ‘to come to yield his auton-
omy to a world viewed as machine’.
That this worldview was established well beyond the arti-
ficial intelligence community was also troubling—and he 
felt it was demonstrated by the enthusiastic response of some 
professional therapists to ELIZA. Reporting that some psy-
chiatrists believed the DOCTOR computer program could 
grow into a ‘nearly completely automatic form of psycho-
therapy’, Weizenbaum lamented that specialists in human to 
human interaction could ‘…view the simplest mechanical 
parody of a single interviewing technique as having captured 
anything of the essence of a human encounter’ (1976: 3). 
He concluded moreover, that such a response was only pos-
sible because the therapists concerned already had a view of 
the world as machine, and already thought of themselves as 
‘information processor(s)’; the outlines of his engagement 
with behaviorism here begin to appear.
Weizenbaum was also concerned with the inverse of 
the egregious presumption of high machine intelligence 
in ELIZA; the imputation of (human-like) life into a 
machine. Many users related to the program in anthropo-
morphic ways (1976: 6) he reported, relating to ELIZA as 
a personality—and a personality, that was, if not precisely 
a therapist, then at least a helpful interlocutor. Famously, 
Weizenbaum’s secretary told him to leave the room while 
she finished her consultation. Sherry Turkle noted that 
even the ‘sophisticated users’ she talked with, who knew 
they were interacting with a dumb program, related to 
ELIZA ‘as though it did understand, as though it were a 
person’ (1984: 40, 39). Moreover, she suggested that it 
was precisely ELIZA’s machinic personality that was the 
allure for her socially averse informants; young computer 
scientists who did not necessarily want to talk to other 
human ‘persons’ (Turkle, 2005).
3  Rationality/logicality
Computer Power and Human Reason, combining philo-
sophical inquiry, pedagogical disquisition, and critique, 
responded directly to these concerns. At its core is a con-
sideration of human versus computer autonomy turning on 
a rejection of the ‘rationality–logicality equation’ (1976: 
365), or the making equivalent of human and machine 
forms of thinking. The demand is for the maintenance of 
the recognition of an essential difference between human 
and machine ‘intelligence’,  a refusal of the equating of 
(human) ‘rational thought’ with (the computer’s) ‘logical 
operations’ tout court. This produces an attack on the pre-
sumption that, because (human) rationality can be under-
stood in terms of (machine) logicality and machine proce-
dures, then the former can be fully operationalized—and 
reproduced—by the latter. The desire to ‘build a machine 
on the model of a man… which can ultimately ….contem-
plate the whole domain of human thought’ (1976: 204), 
which would operationalize this desire, is characterized 
as ‘the deepest ‘the deepest and most grandiose fantasy 
that motivates work on artificial intelligence’ (1976: 203).
This ‘fantasy’, moreover, exposes the reality that for-
mally equating these two forms of intelligence—the 
human and the artificial—does not produce a working 
equality between them in practice (even in speculative 
practice). On the contrary, the result of equating human 
and macine intelligence is the prioritization of logical 
operations over human rationality and—therefore—the 
prioritization of machinic over human values. Challeng-
ing this prioritization does not have to entail discarding 
the logical wholesale: Weizenbaum understood the power 
of ‘logical operations’ and recognized that these opera-
tions would become increasingly autonomous. Moreover, 
he recognized that their terrain would expand as comput-
ers became able to internalize ‘ever more complex and 
more faithful models of ever larger slices of reality’ (Wei-
zenbaum, 1972: 175). Machine ‘autonomy’ (1976: 610) 
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should be valued, he argued, but its nature should also be 
more closely addressed.
4  The critique of AI science
Weizenbaum approached the question of the nature of 
thought through a consideration of the human—natu-
rally enough, given his argument that the most important 
effect the computer would have on society would be to pro-
duce radical changes in ‘man’s image of himself’ (1972, 
610), although this was also a somewhat heretical route, 
given the priorities of his own community at the time. 
For Weizenbaum ‘whether or not human thought is entirely 
computable’—that is to say reducible to logical formal-
ism—was a matter of ontology, in marked contrast to then 
dominant AI approaches based on simulation as a method 
and a benchmark. Simulation criterion work on the assump-
tion that ‘what looks intuitive can be formalized, and that if 
you discover the right formalization you can get a machine 
to do it.’ (Turkle, 2005: 246); there is nothing in the sim-
ulation criterion that says a program has to attain human 
forms of rationality or ‘thought’ to model human behavior 
or to successfully perform it.7 Disputing the existence of 
transferable—because formalizable—modes of intelligence, 
and focussing on human ontology, Weizenbaum thus put 
himself in conflict with the ‘primacy of the program’ or the 
claim that, as a system, AI could become; ‘as psychoanalysis 
and Marxism had been…a new way of understanding almost 
everything’ (Turkle, 2005: 246)8; social systems as well as 
human minds, notably.
For Weizenbaum, the key is not transferability but 
specificity. He makes an ontological distinction between 
human intelligence and computer logic, and sees a sharp 
and unbridgeable division between computer operations 
(which may exhibit forms of internal autonomy) and human 
becoming. Human intelligence, not viewed in narrowly 
mentalist terms, comes to concern embodiment, emo-
tion, recognition and reciprocation. Human ‘smartness’ is 
unique because entangled with forms of bodily being. This 
also means that distinctions between human and computer 
intelligence cannot rely on divisions between emotion and 
intellect. Both are entailed in what constitutes a specifically 
human intelligence. Weizenbaum thus also broke with an 
‘enduring discourse’ around the divided self (Turkle 1976: 
312); human ratiocination is not to fall on the side of ‘that 
which can be simulated’ while human emotions stand for 
everything that cannot. Computer logics, autonomous or not, 
dealing with human emotions or other forms of human cog-
nition or not, are always alienated from human intelligence. 
Indeed, they are ‘alien’:
‘What could be more obvious…than that the intelli-
gence a computer ‘can muster’, ‘however acquired’ 
must always and necessarily be…alien to any and all 
authentic human concerns’? (Weizenbaum, 1976:226).
Weizenbaum’s attack on the rationality–logicality equa-
tion is thus conducted through an intervention into thinking 
around cybernetics (programmable humans and formalizable 
system logics), a critique of the adequacy of simulation as 
a measure of AI success, and through the assertion of the 
ontological distinctiveness of the embodied human and their 
intelligence. Applying these arguments to ELIZA may be 
viewed as breaking a butterfly upon a wheel—and in a sense 
the real targets were elsewhere.
5  Alien logics as discursively prior
Weizenbaum feared that the rationality/logicality equation, 
not feasible as a route to achieving AI’s goals (as the rela-
tive failure of ELIZA underscored), was already operating 
as a powerful explanatory discourse, impacting on human 
understandings of their own intelligence and being. As a 
consequence, the urgent questions arising around compu-
tational intelligence, and its diffusion into human streams 
of consciousness and human societies, were ethical rather 
than ‘mathematical or technological’ (1976: 661). If they 
were not addressed, he argued, it was because humans had 
already ‘made the world too much into a computer’ (1976: 
ix), and in doing so had ‘abdicated to technology the very 
duty to formulate questions’. His concern was that the de-
prioritization of human values in favour of ‘scientific world-
views’ (or the certainty of the program and its solutions) had 
already become a ‘common sense dogma [that had] virtually 
delegitimized all other ways of understanding’ (1976: 611).
Weizenbaum thus feared a switch in explanatory mecha-
nisms; the application of ‘alien’ logics to organize properly 
human affairs and human conflicts. If the presumption is 
that there are no purely human forms of intelligence, and 
therefore no ‘human values’ that are incommensurate with 
machines, then, (notes Weizenbaum), what is really being 
suggested is that, in an increasingly computational world, 
‘the existence of human values themselves’ is not to be 
allowed (1976: 14). We might say that such values become 
illegible within the terms of the operational, or dominant, 
7 The intersection between theories of the performative production 
of human selves and questions of agency intersect here in interesting 
ways; one of the early critiques of Butler’s initial conceptions of per-
formativity as subjectivity was that it left no space for agency within 
the constraints of a discourse that produces the subject it names. (see 
Butler’s Gender Trouble, 1993).
8 Turkle notes she uses this term to refer to ‘ a wide range of com-
putational processes, in no way limited to serial programs written in 
standard programming languages.’ (Turkle, 2007: 246).
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discourse and its language. This might be how ‘equality’ 
has, in operation, reversed an earlier ‘priority’: Human over 
machine/machine over human.
The consequences of the switch to machine values are felt 
at multiple scales and registers. If rational argumentation is 
really only ‘logicality’, which follows if (human) rational-
ity itself, has been ‘tragically twisted so as to equate it with 
logicality’ (1976: 13), then human conflicts and disagree-
ments are reduced to ‘failures of communication’ which may 
best be sorted by ‘information handling techniques’ (1976: 
14), and in this way real contradictions are rendered into 
‘merely apparent contradiction(s)’ to be ‘untangled by judi-
cious application of cold logic derived from some higher 
standpoint’ (1976: 13).
What is envisaged is a system where human-held prin-
ciples or beliefs (for instance in justice, equality, or indi-
vidual freedom) are increasingly regarded as irrelevant to 
the administration and/or governance of the society, or of 
the self. Governance is instead to be accomplished through 
the embedding of new mechanisms of cybernetic control 
that may produce resolution, and perhaps what might be 
termed ‘good order’, without recourse to human judgment. 
An over-reliance on computational logics could, in short, 
produce the kind of society in which failing to understand 
‘what is distinctive about a human judge, or psychiatrist, 
what distinguishes them from a machine’ is not recognized 
as an obvious ‘obscenity’ (1976: 226).
6  The ‘obvious obscenity’: behaviorism and/
as control
Computer Power and Human Reason is—explicitly and 
implicitly—an engagement with behaviorism—notably 
the behaviorism of B.F. Skinner. This mechanical model 
of human psychology, influential at the time, was ready 
‘to hand’ for AI researchers (1976, 1972) and meshed with 
their tendency to reverse the human out of the machine. As 
Weizenbaum noted, over at MIT AI pioneer Marvin Minksy 
had defined the human as a ‘meat machine’ (see Weizen-
baum 1972: 160).
Central to Skinnerian behaviourism is its rejection of 
an inner self as motivating human actions, and an exclu-
sive focus on genetic endowment and environment. The 
key to psychological change is conditioning via environ-
mental modification, with the aim being the production of 
positive feedback loops that generate new forms of good 
behavior (Skinner 1971). In Skinner’s lab conditioning was 
undertaken in ‘Skinner boxes’, fully enclosed environments 
in which pigeon subjects bound into cybernetic circuits of 
positive behavioral reinforcement learnt to peck for rewards9 
(see Bowker 2016; Freedman 2012). However, Skinner 
argued for societal-wide applications of his work. Behavior-
ist principles, he argued, should be implemented through the 
introduction of widespread conditioning mechanisms able 
to govern societies safely. Social conditioning loops could 
direct human behaviors towards the ‘right’ ends thereby pro-
ducing ‘automatic goodness’, this last not a matter of the 
simulation of (good) intentions, but of engendering concrete 
actions undertaken by the appropriately conditioned human 
objects. An extreme expression of this perspective is found 
in Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner: 1971), 
published within 3 or 4 years of Human Reason. Review-
ing it, under the headline ‘B.F. Skinner says we can’t afford 
freedom’, Time magazine summed up its message as:
‘…familiar to followers of Skinner, but startling to the 
uninitiated: we can no longer afford freedom, and so it 
must be replaced with control over man, his conduct, 
and his culture’. (Time, 1971).
Behaviorism was in conflict with other therapeutic 
approaches then current, notably those that sought to work 
with subjects to raise their capacity for self-knowledge and 
autonomous action. In particular, person-centred Rogerian 
therapy, developed by Carl Rogers in the 1940s and 1950s, 
was hostile to behaviorism and its desire to automate human 
behavior. Rogerian therapy, inimical to systems-level think-
ing in general (and, therefore, also at odds with Lacanian-
inflected cybernetics), exchanged behavior modification pro-
grammes designed to change actions in the external world, 
for projects of work on the self, to be undertaken by the 
subject, with the goal of self actualization (2004). The latter 
being defined as:
‘….the curative force in psychotherapy... man’s ten-
dency to actualize himself, to become his potentiali-
ties... to express and activate all the capacities of the 
organism’ (Rogers 2004).
The differences  between these Schools,  arising 
around effectiveness (the discourse of ‘what works’and its 
justifications) produced fierce disputes over the ethics and 
morals of therapeutic modulation. Carl Rogers was deeply 
troubled by the Skinnerian offer of ‘automatic goodness’ 
(Rogers 1971) as a social ‘cure’ for anything—and con-
cerned by the failure of the Skinner model to engage with 
questions of commitment. Is the behavior of the ‘freedom 
rider’ heading down to the US South in civil rights battles 
attributable only to stimuli and conditioning, he asked?
9 Skinner also hoped to use pigeons to guide missiles (Bowker, 2016, 
Freedman, 2012). Studies in economic behaviorism in the past used 
pigeons and other animals as test subjects (Battalio, 1981).
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These issues were argued out between Skinner and 
Rogers themselves in public debates (see e.g. A Dialogue 
on Education and Control, 1976). Noam Chomsky also 
weighed in with ‘The Case Against B.F. Skinner’, a review 
of Beyond Freedom and Dignity that amounted to a corus-
cating attack on the social programme of Skinnerism, and 
which set out to demolish its scientific rigor and denounce 
the morality of conditioning as a mode of social control 
(Chomsky 1971).
Skinnerism broke the human down. All there is, said 
Skinner, is a genetic endowment and an environment, and 
the latter may be manipulated through environmental pro-
grammes, effectively cybernetic loops, designed to pro-
duce the desired adaptions in behavior without reference 
to conscious human decision-making. By contrast Roger’s 
person-centred therapy engaged with the human and sought 
to develop their autonomy. The schism between these posi-
tions is revived today in relation to debates around emerg-
ing forms of behavioral modulation—particularly when it is 
computer-assisted; a move described by some as a shift from 
‘nudge’ to ‘hyper-nudge’ (see Yeung 2012); these debates 
are the subject of the final sections of the article. But rais-
ing the old conflicts also produces a further question about 
ELIZA;—not whether ELIZA was a therapist at all, but what 
kind, of therapy could - ELIZA deliver?
7  ELIZA the Rogerian machine?
Two possibilities present themselves. There is ELIZA the 
automatic therapist, the machine arbiter of human affairs. 
This is the ELIZA whose (albeit very unformed and/or fic-
tional) existence is said to provide evidence that the behav-
iorist model of psychology, based on modulation, might, in 
the future, be operationalized in new ways through compu-
tational automation, and that this turn of events might be 
welcomed by a mis-informed public.
But there is also the ELIZA not only designated—but 
designed—as a Rogerian rather than a Skinnerian therapist. 
It was, after all, a Rogerian script that organized the interac-
tions and intersections between human and machine ELIZA 
organized. And if humans found ELIZA useful perhaps it 
was as a mirror, a listening surface which enabled forms 
of self-examination, self expression, or self re-narrativiza-
tion. If users found something revealing in their interactions 
with ELIZA then that something was their own: ELIZA 
never did, and does not now, deliver injunctions, sugges-
tions—or nudges; and has no program to promulgate. Elu-
cidate was all that was said to me.
Admittedly a central tenet of Rogerian therapy is that a 
relationship of human empathy be generated between ana-
lyst and analysand, so ELIZA and ‘her’ computational prog-
eny might always be disqualified from the role of Rogerian 
analyst by virtue of their alien souls. But there is, nonethe-
less, something suggestively dissonant in the proposition 
that the first computational therapist was not programmed 
to deliver the conditioning proposed by Skinner, and feared 
by Weizenbaum, but on the contrary offered a rudimentary 
talking cure. If the ‘intention’10 of this computer-delivered 
‘artificial’ therapy was not the modulation of a behavior, 
did it, on the contrary, deal in self-actualization—something 
like an increase in self? If so, then even if Weizenbaum 
thought ELIZA was a ‘monster’ she was a monster that was 
in many ways on his side; perhaps a hopeful monster, in 
Haraway’s terms (Haraway 1992).
This slide into zoomorphism/anthropomorphism (and 
gendered ascription) is intended. It gestures towards the 
importance of registering how ELIZA was experienced 
by its/her users—and relevant here is both users’ sense of 
the value of an exchange undertaken between human and 
machine, and what they were willing to ‘read in’ to the 
exchanges—the willing presumption by the human speaker 
that there is a real listener is striking in many transcripts of 
exchanges. In the place of an ontological schism between 
machine logicality and human rationality perhaps what 
arises here, as part of an experience involving code and nar-
ration, is a form of ‘x-morphism’ (Laurier and Philo 1999).
ELIZA the Rogerian machine; that impossible thing.
This certainly complicates Weizenbaum’s sense that a 
misplaced equation (logicality/rationality) will automati-
cally lead to the priority of machine (logicality) over human 
(rationality). ELIZA indeed, might be said to demonstrate 
different ways in which the division underpinning that equa-
tion fails to hold. In this way what is also signaled is the 
possibility that a socio-technic relation, that may be termed 
therapeutic, that does not cleave to either the modulation 
model nor attach itself to a desire for a purely  human  form 
of self-realized autonomy might be generated, might emerge, 
or might be—cautiously—invoked.
8  Self‑actualization versus dronic 
de‑actualization: The renewed salience 
of therapy wars
ELIZA’s visiblity has varied over the past decades.11 Today 
the ELIZA story speaks very directly to how work on the 
self, modification of the self, adjustment of the self, is 
10 There is no assertion here that ELIZA the therapist had intention-
ality, but in so far as the program set out to effectively undertake an 
interaction within the Rogerian register intention was involved.
11 Today renewed interest in ELIZA, and in Weizenbaum’s own 
story, is a symptom of ‘automation anxiety’ (Bassett, Roberts, Pay, 
2017) currently in evidence, triggered by developments in AI and 
new waves of cybernation.
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undertaken in computational capitalism and to how this 
work is transforming as accelerating cycles of cognitive 
automation produce new and increasingly impure (aug-
mented, automated, assembled, x-morphed) streams of con-
sciousness and being; and in doing so raise new questions 
about control, agency and freedom.
Some of these developments are relatively recent. Calls 
for responsibilization and a work on the self as a labour of 
the self—self therapy, self-improvement, and self-direction 
- were seen as likely to be augmented by the possibilities of 
computation and its increased efficiencies in the early net 
era (see Giddens 1991; Miller 2008; Bassett 2009; Mow-
labocus 2016). But this injunction has changed. Forms of 
work on the self that focus on self-labour as a desirable pri-
ority are being replaced by explorations of the potentials of 
direct modulation of the self by a third party—increasingly 
via computational processes that require neither ‘work’ nor 
‘expertise’ on the part of the human (Ruckenstein 2017; 
Schull 2016), but demand  only the submission, of the 
human, to the process.
This is the context in which a revisionist form of behav-
iorism may re-emerge and make claims for legitimacy. 
Nudge is one, now familiar, form in which it is being opera-
tionalized. Essentially nudge joins psychology to behavioral 
economics to produce new tools for governance and markets 
that very often take software. Moreover, if the therapeutic 
nudge is emerging as a likely key mechanism to control or 
modulate data subjects, the new behaviorists, at least those in 
the mainstream, tend to be more deft than Skinner was, and 
do not repeat his strident exhortations to society to exchange 
freedom for control. They stress instead forms of libertarian 
paternalism orchestrated through ‘choice architectures’ that 
leave the user ‘free’ to decide not to join the programme, but 
encouraged to do so (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). The lat-
ter have argued fiercely that the nudge is consensual, and it 
turns out that we often do want to be nudged. As popular and 
critical commentators have pointed out (see e.g. Freedman 
in the Atlantic, 2012, Newsweek, 2008) the default option, 
operating when ‘the chooser chooses not to make a choice’ 
is powerful precisely because it is much used (Will 2008). 
However, obvious anxieties arise (and are acknowledged as 
issues) around the transition from the (consensual) nudge 
to (involuntarily administered) modificatory push (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2008).
9  The droning of experience?
Therapy demands work on the self, traditionally work under-
taken by the self, with the expert help of another. Behavioral 
therapy takes the consciously acting self out of that equa-
tion so that (for the human at least) the work of change is 
automated. The human simply experiences an environment 
and responds to what it introduces. The right response pro-
duces a reward. In the case of AI programmes designed to 
deliver behavioral shifts (computationally delivered nudge 
programmes for instance), what is evidenced is a re-dou-
bled extension of automation; the taking over by intelligent 
agents of previously human work, and the replacement of 
conscious human insight with computational expertise.
In tune with this is Mark Andrejevic’s ‘post-psychoana-
lytic’ vision of emerging forms of life, in a sensor society, 
explored through a consideration of the ‘droning of experi-
ence’. This can be understood as anticipatory and diagnostic, 
but also as a commentary on emerging events; the drone, 
after all, is an excellent figure to get at ‘the people we will 
become’ inside a new—shinier, bigger, tighter—Skinne-
rian box (Bowker, 2016). Andrejevic stresses not only the 
excision of human intellection in new social circuits but the 
compensatory attention paid to the modulation of human 
affect—and the forms of being available to the subjects-
turned-objects of these circuits.
The discussion takes as a figure lethal automated weap-
ons systems (LAWs), drone systems which work with pre-
codified priorities but go ‘raw’ in operation, when they work 
through an appeal to affective bodily signals rather than tap-
ping the conscious perceptions of human personnel. In the 
field ‘top down’ human cognitive inputs are thus cut out so 
that although the human is still in the circuit the controller 
function has been taken by AI intelligences. This materiali-
zation of (human) desires is peculiar;—the weapons give us 
what ‘we’ ordered, but the desiring human does not speak or 
cogitate, and the non-desiring machine does not listen. What 
is put into language, or what emerges into language from the 
unconscious mind, or inner self, as human ratiocination is 
irrelevant. Indeed, there is no time afforded for listening to 
human cogitation; the intention is that identification, analy-
sis, and action are instantaneous in the drone attack. This 
accelerated temporality is partly why it is designated as an 
example of the coming into operation of what Andrejevic 
labels, following Bogost—but here there are sudden echoes 
of Weizenbaum—a new form of ‘alien thinking’ (Andreje-
vic, 2015, Bogost, 2012).
The step from LAWs to principles organizing opera-
tions across social networks is not difficult to make. Here 
the direct modulation of the self is undertaken through 
sentiment and mood analysis—which once again short-
circuits conscious intentions or stated desires. The claim 
is that increasingly these developments, alongside others 
including neuro-marketing, can turn us into our ‘own intel-
ligent agents’, a process that paradoxically entails giving 
up conscious agency. The point, as with LAWs, is to ‘…by 
pass… the forms of conscious reaction and deliberation that 
threaten to introduce ‘friction’ into the system’ (Andrejevic, 
2015: 204).
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This, then, is the ‘droning of experience’, and it is intrinsic 
to the rise of forms of ‘control via the modulation of affect’ 
that are taken to be an emerging mode of social organization 
(Andrejevic, 2015). ‘To drone’ is to render human experience 
into what Andrejevic calls ‘object experience’ through the 
application of the computational—and, of course, he is not 
the only one to identify this as a pervasive trajectory currently 
(see e.g. Kant 2015). What is striking about this account how-
ever is that droning is considered, by Andrejevic, as a succes-
sor form of therapeutic action—or as ‘post-psychoanalytic’. 
As I read this, in this vision of a coming world, the self is not 
helped to actualize (perhaps through computational augmen-
tation) but is rather deleted. The human, now an object in the 
network, is analysed for the signals it provides, not listened to 
for what it says, and its trails and traces—its exhausts—are 
now dealt with rather than being ‘recognized’ or ‘brought to 
[the human’s] …attention’.
In so far as such forms of operation, such behaviorism, 
become central to the mediatized organization of experi-
ence, then it is justified to claim that while one mode of the 
therapeutic (that focusing on an inner self) expires, a new 
mode of therapy, which is based on the prioritizing of one 
controlling intelligence, and the routing around of another, 
becomes key to new modes of life. Here is the new cen-
trality of a revived behavioral therapeutic—not a sideshow 
in discussion of what changed forms or streams of intelli-
gence could, or could not, do, but a central principle through 
which control is administered today.
10  Remaining non‑inhuman beings?
The Skinnerian goal of ‘automatic good’ is thus again taken 
up, and taken seriously—and once again an indifference to 
the questions ‘whose good, good for whom, good in what or 
whose sense?’ becomes (dangerously) acceptable in popular 
discourse—and a conscious revisionism emerges. This latter 
re-defines the goals of Skinnerism and re-thinks the morality 
and ethics of the possible application of behaviorist prin-
ciples to the wider social world (see e.g. Freedman in the 
Atlantic). This explicit revisionism is implicit in much of the 
discussion of the acceptability of Nudge and evident also in 
debates around neuro-ethics (see e.g. Yeung, 2012).
New ways of automating the modulating of human behav-
ior return to sharp salience the older debates about behav-
iorism and the mechanical conception of ‘man’ as apt for 
adjustment—which turn into polemics around existential 
freedom versus security. Some forms of anti-computing 
(Bassett 2017), emerging as a response to the computer 
assisted rise of new forms of behaviorism, reject any role 
for the computer in the exercise of the therapeutic; in the 
healing and the changing the self (and this, of course, was 
Weizenbaum’s position in his time).
A different response, and the one pursued here, responds 
to the rise of computationally driven behaviorism, taken 
as an increasingly dominant mode of social therapy, with 
a question. It seems important to me to ask what other forms 
of therapeutic engagement, between human and intelli-
gent machine, might there be? And how might such engage-
ments assist in generating new forms of life in a world of 
hybrid and impure streams of consciousness?
This returns me to ELIZA, by design not a Skinnerian 
machine remember, but also, as a machine, unable to fully 
deliver that form of human empathy a Rogerian therapist 
might; and indeed ELIZA in the end would be quite inca-
pable of generating the forms of fully human authenticity 
that Roger’s atomistic concentration on a prior inner self-
demanded (see Geller 1982). So, a transitional machine 
perhaps. Earlier I said ELIZA might be a hopeful monster 
precisely because, as a Rogerian Machine, she appeared 
impossible, but worked. In that role we might say ‘she’ suc-
ceeded (in the past), and succeeds again now, in provoking 
a re-think of polemical positions around the computational 
therapeutic.
Thinking about ELIZA as transitional object points 
to ways to re-think the engagement between therapy and 
technology. It suggests that a ‘cure’ for the position we find 
ourselves in, in relation to this world, which is itself poi-
soned by technocratic rationality, might be found in part 
through the technological as also curative. The point would 
be the generation of a mode of therapy which does not 
cleave entirely either to the narrative (cure) and the human 
rationale, nor to the logical operations laid down in code 
that would automate expertise and experience so that we are 
only ever moved by technology, rather than improving—or 
finding—or augmenting ourselves through it.
On the other hand, this object-designation (‘transitional 
object’) downplays ELIZA’s own agency, limited as it was—
and perhaps therefore, the specificity of this media technol-
ogy—which is after all its artificial intelligence. So I would 
prefer to continue to understand ELIZA as a therapist. In this 
form, ELIZA does offer a commentary—and one different 
from Weizenbaum’s own—on contemporary developments.
To the extent that they appear to resonate with real trends, 
Weizenbaum’s fears that the reading of logical operations 
and human intelligence as equivalent would increasingly 
produce a prioritization of the alien intelligence of the com-
puter, so that what began as equality would become domina-
tion, appear to be justified. On the other hand, as we have 
argued, his demand to cut ELIZA down to size by insisting 
on an exclusive focus on procedures ignored what else was 
going on. There was the code. But there was also the story. 
Perhaps we might say that, if ‘ELIZA’ was code, then ‘Eliza’ 
was the comfort found in the machine, by humans, who built 
a different kind of relationship with ‘her’ that exceeded what 
the procedures of code offered, precisely because code came 
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into contact with human thought. ‘Eliza’ against ELIZA 
then; conflicted from the start. No wonder she was such a 
mess. But this conflict may be read in positive terms. You 
might say that ELIZA, in-human as ‘she’ is, contributes to 
the efforts of those ‘trying to remain non-inhuman beings’ 
(Stiegler 2013: 4) in a computational world.
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